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HERALD COMPANY, INC.
V.
WEISENBERG
N. Y. Supreme Court
Appellate Division - First Dep't.
A significant trial court decision on the exclusion of
the press from administrative hearings, Herald Comp any
v. Weisenberg, was published in the Spring, -9F-'l ssue
of this Journal (Vol. II, No. I, p. 36). The decision
was later included In the West Publishing Co. reports
(454 NYS2d 354). On October 29, 1982, however, (two
days after the West advance sheet appeared) the trial
court decision was reversed by a unanimous panel of the
Appellate Division. The first published report of the
Appellate Division opinion follows.
DILLON, P.J.:
We are here asked to decide whether an Administrative Law Judge has the
authority to close to the public and the press an unemployment insurance com-
pensation hearing without conducting a preliminary inquiry to determine the need
for closure and without first affording the press an opportunity to be heard. '
hold that he may not.
The facts may be briefly stated. Two attorneys employed by the Attorney
General participated in an investigation of political corruption in Onondaga
County. Differences arose between them and thir superiors and the two resigned
claiming that their continued employment would violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Following denial of their applications for unemployment insurance
benefits, they were granted a hearing pursuant to Section 620 of the Labor Law.
The hearing was scheduled for May 4, 1981, at which time the Administrative Law
Judge, on claimants' motion, ordered that the hearing be closed and directed that
petitioner's reporter be removed from the hearing room. The reporter's request
for a continuance to allow petitioner to present legal arguments was denied. Fur-
ther proceedings were held behind closed doors but before any decision was rendered,
the determination denying benefits was withdrawn and claimants' applications for
benefits were granted. No proceedings other than those of May 4 were conducted and
thereafter the Administrative Law Judge denied petitioner's request for a steno-
graphic transcript of the closed hearing.
In this Article 78 proceeding, petitioner seeks to vacate the order of
closure and asks that respondent be directed to supply petitioner with the trans-
script. Special Term dismissed the petition. While recognizing that civil and
criminal proceedings are presumptively open to public and press, the court found
that closure was proper because (I) claimants' testimony necessarily would involve
matters that were or had been before the Grand Jury and that public disclosure
thereof would violate Section 215.70 of the Penal Law and would be contemptuous of
an outstanding Supreme Court order prohibiting claimants and others from disclos-
ing "for all time" matters or evidence considered by the Grand Jury; and (2) an
open hearing would violate the nondisclosure provisions of Section 537 of the
Labor Law.
To be resolved at the threshold is the issue of mootness. The petition
is not moot, of course, to the extent that petitioner seeks a transcript of the
hearing. We recognize, however, that claimants' applications for benefits were
granted before any decision or order was entered on the hearing, and no further
hearings will be necessary. Ordinarily, where an action or proceeding has been
thus terminated, it is no longer live for any justiciable purpose (Matter of Hearst
Corp. v. Clyne, 50 NY2d 707). Nonetheless, the dispute should be addressed where,
as here, it is of significant public importance, is likely to recur and is of a
nature that it will otherwise evade review (Matter of Westchester Rockland News-
Papers v. Le9ett., 48 NY2d 430, 436-437).
Turning to the merits, It Is first observed that every citizen may freely
attend the sittings of every court in this state (Judiciary Law, Section 4). That
right may be asserted by the public and the press in both criminal and civil pro-
ceedings (Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett- supra, pp. 437-
438).1 It is clear, therefore, that all judicial proceedings in this state are
presumptively open to the public and the press. This is so because public access
to Judicial proceedings prootes public participation in government and provides
a safeguard for the integrity of the judicial process (matter of Westchester Rock-
land Newspapers v. Leggett, 48 NY2d 430, supr_).
The right of attendance is not absolute, of course (Matter of Westchester
Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, supra, p. 438), and where there are compelling
reasons for closure the right may be denied (see, e.g., Matter of Gannett Co. v.
De Pasquale, 43 NY2d 370, aff'd 443 US 368). It is established, at least in crim-
inal cases, that it may not be denied summarily and that the trial court must con-
duct a preliminary inquiry to determine the need for closure (Matter of Capital
Newspaper Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 56 NY2d 870; Matter of Westchester Rock-
land Newspapers v. Leggett, supra). Moreover, where there Is a legitimate public
concern, as in a trial involving public officials, the trial court should afford
interested members of the news media an opportunity to be heard (Hatter of Gannett
Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 NY2d 370, 381, r).
We conclude that these principles should be applied with equal force to
quasi-judicial proceedings where the process of government is similarly at work
and the integrity of the decision-making process is equally essential to citizen
confidence in government. It follows, therefore, that before granting claimants'
motion to close the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge was required to grant
the request of petitioner's reporter to adjourn the proceedings for a brief period
in order to give petitioner an opportunity to be heard.
I. While the First Amendment constitutional right of attendance has thus far been
Insured only at criminal trials (Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Co. of
Norfolk, US , 50 US Law Week 4759), the Supreme Court has noted that his-
torically both civil and criminal tridls have been presumptively open (Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 US 555, 580, n 17 /-plurality opinion7-
Additionally, absent a showing of compelling reasons for closure, the hear-
ing should be open to the public and the press. No such showing is made here.
surely claimants are not entitled to closure on the basis that their testimony
oould violate either Section 215.70 of the Penal Law or the Suprem" Court "gag"
order reflecting that statutory proscription. Section 215.70 pro Jit; claimants
from intentionally disclosing "to another the nature or substance of any grand
jury testimony, or any decision, result or other matter attending a grand jury
proceeding which is required by law to be kept secret, except in the proper dis-
charge of his official duties or upon written order of the court." If it was the
intention of claimants to violate either the statute or the "gag" order, the pub-
lic interest required that the hearing be open.
Nor does Section 537* of the Labor Law afford a basis for closing the hear-
ing. That section merely provides for the confidentiality and limited use of
information acquired from employers or employees. loreover, we find no other leg-
islative authority for excluding the public and press. Neither the statute (Labor
Law, Section 622) nor the regulation (12 NYCRR 461.4) governing the conduct of
these hearings makes any reference to closure.
This analysis ordinarily would require vacating the order closing the hear-
ing but that would now serve no purpose. The judgment dismissing the petition
should be reversed and the petition should be granted to the extent of directing
respondent forthwith to furnish petitioner with a transcript of the hearing.
Denman, Moule and Schnepp, JJ. concur.
*Editor's Note:
Labor Law Section 537 provides:
Section 537. Disclosures prohibited
1. Use of information. Information acquired from employers or employees pursuant
to this article shall be for the exclusive use and Information of the commissioner
In the discharge of his duties hereunder and shall not be open to the public nor be
used in any court In any action or proceeding pending therein unless the commissioner
Is a party to such action or proceeding, notwithstanding any other provisions of
law. Such information insofar as it is material to the making and determination of
a claim for benefits shall be available to the parties affected and, In the com-
missioner's discretion, may be made available to the parties affected in connection
with effecting placement.
2. Penalties. Any officer or employee of the state, who, without authority of
the commissioner or as otherwise required by law, shall disclose such information
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
3. /The conmissioner is authorized and required to report certain information
to the appropriate federal agency._7
4. Information obtained by the department from the wage reporting system oper-
ated by the state department of taxation and finance shil be considered confidential
and shall not be disclosed to persons or agencies other than those considered
entitled to such information when such disclosure is necessary for the proper admini-
stration of the unemployment benefit system.
amended L.1978, c. 545, Section 5.
